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1Future Fiscal and Budgetary Shocks
Abstract
We study here the eﬀects of future tax and budgetary shocks on
present levels of economic activity and real interest rates in a non-
monetary and possibly non-Ricardian economy. The paper ﬁrst takes
up an (unanticipated) temporary tax cut to be eﬀective on a given
future date—a delayed “debt bomb.” The sudden prospect of this
future-dated shock causes at once a drop in the (unit) value placed on
the ﬁrms’ business asset, the customer, and accordingly on the price
of shares—with the result that the hourly wage, hours worked and
GDP drop in tandem. This paradox of reduced activity through an-
nouncement of future “stimulus” does not hinge on an upward jump
of long rates of interest, which may or may not occur: the short rate
of return on shares is increased by the initial drop in their price, but
the price has so much farther to fall that this is more than oﬀset for
a time by the expectation of ongoing capital loss, so short rates of in-
terest actually drop. The paper next studies a future tax cut lacking
a “sunset” provision and requiring instead a gradual welfare beneﬁt
adjustment to retain solvency. The same negative eﬀects on present
activity result. Third, the paper shows that if the tax cut is eﬀective
immediately, its eﬀect is ambiguous, as the Marshallian supply-sider
eﬀect works the other way. Finally, the paper also examines the new
anticipation of a future increase in the number of retirees in a pay-
as-you-go social security program. In conclusion, juxtaposing these
results against recent US experience, we hypothesize that the legis-
lation of an unsustainable ﬁscal gap—the cuts in tax rates and the
rise of future obligations owing to the cumulative deﬁcit and the ap-
proaching bulge in retirement beneﬁts—is an important cause of the
decline in hours worked per employee and in the participation rates
over the period. (JEL: E24, E43, E62, F41)
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1The impetus for this paper was the enactment in summer 2001 of the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA), familiarly known as the
ﬁrst Bush tax cut. This bill was another structural tax cut, one interpretable
as aimed at boosting rates of investment, thus economic growth, and, it was said,
thereby shrinking the medium-term natural unemployment rate.1 The bill also had
the backloading feature, one present to a lesser degree in the multi-stage Reagan
tax cut enacted in 1981, of scheduling the largest rate reductions in the future years
from 2005 to 2010—yet proponents of the bill said that its backloaded cuts would
have announcement eﬀects exerting an expansionary impulse on employment and
investment in the present. The bill also had the novelty of providing “sunset” of
the tax cuts in 2011. This legislation has left economists unsure and divided about
its eﬀects. We suggest that the ﬁrst step toward clarity, whether or not resolution
of our divisions, is to investigate the eﬀects of such an (unanticipated) ﬁscal shock
on the natural, or equilibrium, path of the unemployment rate—or its neoclassical
counterpart, hours worked per employee. Accordingly we conduct in this paper an
intertemporal-equilibrium analysis of such a ﬁscal shock in a model that abstracts
from monetary channels.
This perspective on the economics of taxation is a marked departure from the
postwar tax literature. For Keynesians ﬁscal policy was all about the deployment
of tax rates to moderate swings in business activity—in both supply-side and
Keynesian models (Abba Lerner, 1946; Robert Mundell, 1971). Theorists of a
more neoclassical persuasion focused on shifts of tax rates appropriate to shifts
in circumstances presumed to be permanent. Early investigations, often recalling
Ramsey, explored the “neoclassical principles” for the design of ﬁscal policy (Paul
Samuelson, 1951, 1953). One of the last in this genre argued that the (ﬂat) tax
rate was best set at the level needed for an unchanging public debt (Robert Barro,
1979).
1True, those who saw employment as still well above their estimates of its natural level
believed that unemployment was on its way up. But even if employment had been seen
as below estimates of its natural level, the bill’s proponents would have defended the bill
as a ﬁllip to growth and a boost to employment.
2But, with the Reagan era, times changed. Tax rates have now been used
as a strategic instrument to preempt expansion of welfare entitlements in the
expectation that doing so will succeed in lowering future tax rates as well or
at any rate lessening their rise. In this new world, the tax rates are more like
shocks than responses to shocks and the government’s entitlement spending may
be endogenous rather than parametric. With this paradigm shift in the way ﬁscal
policy is conceived, the Ramseyan framework needs some changes. However, it
is no longer clear that such a framework is well-suited to capture the immediate
impacts on rates of investment in business assets that sudden prospects of future
tax-rate decreases may have. For example, we would like our model to contain
the prices of the one or more business assets in which the existing ﬁrms invest. It
would be nice to see ﬁrms!
We use here a model of the closed non-Ricardian economy in which output is
sold on a customer market and, for simplicity, the labor variable is hours worked. A
key feature is the shadow price of an incremental customer: a decrease operates to
reduce the demand wage and thus decreases hours worked. In this model, we ﬁnd
three eﬀects on present economic activity from enactment of a wage income tax
cut eﬀective with or without a delay and with or without a sunset provision. One
of these eﬀects is the classical supply-side eﬀect of the reduced tax rate on hours
of work supplied. But there are one or two other eﬀects, both operating through
the asset price. Except in the Ricardian case, there are Feldstein-Rubin-Summers
consequences of the lower tax rates in the future for the future stock of public debt
and thus for future short real rates of interest, and these imply an immediate drop
of the shadow price in the present, thus decreasing present hours and output—
even though the present short real rate drops. Furthermore, if the tax cut in the
medium-term future is accommodated by a subsequent tax increase rather than
entitlement reductions, there are also consequences for current earnings on the
business asset, which also lead to a drop in the present shadow price.
After the exposition of the basic model in section 1 the paper has three parts
corresponding to the three shocks, ﬁscal and budgetary, that we study—a future
tax cut with the sunset provision, a delayed as well as an immediate tax cut without
3the sunset provision, and a future increase in the number of retirees. In section 2,
we begin with a future “debt bomb,” one that is announced at t0 to occur at t1—a
“time bomb” of exploding public debt, such as the present enactment of a tax cut
to become eﬀective at a future date and with a sunset provision soon thereafter.
(Thus there is some small interval over which there is a big government deﬁcit).
We show that this shock depresses the (unit) value of the business asset, the
price of shares, hours worked and thus the GDP. The drop in share price raises the
earnings-price ratio, which (taken alone) increases the rate of return, but generates
expectations of capital loss, with the latter dominating, so the Wicksellian natural
short rate of interest drops in the present. Contrary to what many in the debate
suppose, the paradox of output contraction does not hinge on an immediate rise
of the long-term real interest rate, which may or may not occur. In this section,
as an addendum, we also show how any inﬂation-targeting central bank following
a Taylor rule would set its short-term interest rate (the federal funds rate in the
US) in such a ﬁscal environment.
In section 3, we investigate the eﬀects of a delayed as well as an immediate
permanent tax cut with entitlement spending adjusting gradually to retain sol-
vency. We ﬁnd that the extent to which entitlement spending as a ratio to GDP
will have to be cut as the debt-income ratio rises depends on how far tax rev-
enue falls relative to government interest cost savings when asset prices fall. Even
when ﬁscally sustainable, a delayed permanent tax cut is shown to produce the
paradoxical result of employment contraction as asset prices unambiguously de-
cline. The extent of the decline in asset prices is greater the earlier is the future
event, rendering ambiguous the net eﬀect on economic activity of an immediate
tax cut. We show that hours worked is pulled up by the direct Marshallian impact
of the (immediate) decrease of the tax rate on the demand wage but pushed down
by the (proportionately greater) drop in stock market capitalization as a ratio to
GDP whose depressing eﬀect on the demand wage through its impact on markups
dominates the resulting wealth eﬀect on labor supply.
Section 4 extends the basic model to include retirement and studies the problem
of a prospective increase in the share of retired people in the population under a
4pay-as-you-go social security system. In the concluding section, we argue that a
theory of dynamic markup variation, such as the one developed in this paper, is
needed on top of changes in marginal tax rates if we are to quantitatively account
for labor-leisure distortions in the US at medium-term frequencies.
Roberto Perotti (1999) examines both theoretically and empirically how drastic
cuts in government deﬁcits—ﬁscal consolidation—in countries with exceptionally
high levels of the debt-GDP ratio tend to lead to consumption booms.2 His pa-
per diﬀers from ours in neglecting employment responses by assuming perfectly
inelastic supplies of labor, and relies on a competitive framework. Phelps (1992)
develops a closed-economy customer market model and examines a public debt
shock but it does not incorporate the distortionary eﬀect of the wage income tax
that plays a crucial role in this paper and it neither analyzes the eﬀects of a back-
loaded tax cut nor studies the endogenous evolution of the debt-income ratio in
a fully speciﬁed general-equilibrium system. Based upon their empirical study of
the US economy, Paul Beaudry and Franck Portier (2004) make a case for the im-
portance of expectational shocks in explaining business ﬂuctuations. They suggest
that these shocks take the form of news regarding shifts in future technological
possibilities. Our paper, however, shows that present concerns about future ﬁs-
cal and budgetary overhangs that do not directly aﬀect technological possibilities
might nonetheless also depress current asset prices and contract employment.
1. The Basic Model of the Non-Ricardian Economy With No Retirement
Our basic model describes a closed economy with no retirement. It is not
the Ricardian type of economy favored by RBC theorists and some public ﬁnance
theorists. Instead, we follow the treatment by Blanchard (1985) in which worker-
savers toil throughout life, save by buying annuities invested in the shares of the
ﬁrms, and die oﬀ exponentially.3 In order to provide a business asset to back the
2Perotti (1999) also provides a review of the related papers on “expansionary ﬁscal
consolidations” but these papers do not rely on the supply-side channels and asset price
channels emphasized in our paper.
3This model nests the special case of the Ricardian economy exhibiting Ricardian equiv-
5shares of ﬁrms, and in order to give a role to the variation of price-marginal cost
markups in explaining the big changes in the distortive gap between the value
marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution in consumption
and leisure (the “marginal value of time” measured in consumption units), we use
the customer-market model set up by Phelps and Sidney Winter (1970) and placed
in a general-equilibrium setting by Guillermo Calvo and Phelps (1983) and Bruce
Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz (2003).4 Owing to frictions in the transmission of
price information, the competition of ﬁrms for market share will fail to wipe out
all pure proﬁt, and so leave the optimal price charged by ﬁrms hanging above the
average and marginal cost. Firms set mark-ups below the monopolist’s level but
above the pure competitor’s level—how high depending upon the value per unit
placed on the average and marginal customer. The output supply and thus also
employment, we show, is an increasing function of this per-unit asset value and a
decreasing function of the tax rate.
Production for the customer market, which is the only commercial market
supplied by ﬁrms using only labor to produce a single homogeneous good, is carried
out by a large (constant) number of atomistic ﬁrms in identical (or symmetrical)
circumstances. The size of the population and the stock of customers are equal to a
positive constant, which we normalize to one. Hence the number of customers per
ﬁrm is a demographic parameter in our closed economy. There are four marketable
assets—shares, which are titles to the stream of proﬁts, private short- and long-
alence obtained by setting a parameter representing the probability of death to zero. We
point out later that the inﬂuence of a change in the wage income tax rate on current earn-
ings on business assets and thus on share prices does not depend on the non-Ricardian
nature of the economy.
4Julio Rotemberg and Michael Woodford (1992) argued convincingly that a model
featuring imperfect competition in the product market is required in order to explain how
aggregate demand changes, such as increases in government purchases, can increase output
while at the same time raise the real wage. Our paper goes a step further to argue that
fully accounting for variations in the distortive gap between the value marginal product of
labor and the marginal rate of substitution in consumption and leisure requires tracking
not only changes in the tax rate but also changes in the price-marginal cost markup.
6term bonds issued and held by individuals, and government bonds. These non-
monetary assets are assumed to be perfect substitutes so arbitrage among them
implies that they have the same expected short-term rate of return. It will be
innocuous but convenient to suppose that all (non-human) wealth, in equilibrium,
is held in the form of shares and public debt. A proportional wage income tax is
imposed to ﬁnance government expenditure.
Agents derive utility from consumption and leisure, have ﬁnite lives and face
an instantaneous probability of death µ that is constant throughout life. Let c(s;t)
denote consumption at time t of an agent born at time s, l(s;t) the number of hours
worked, w(s;t) non-human wealth, and h(s;t) human wealth. Also let yg(s;t) be
welfare entitlement received and vh(s;t) be the after-tax real hourly wage (both
measured in units of output, our numeraire good), where vh is related to the
hourly labor cost to the ﬁrm, vf, by vf ´ (1+¿)vh, ¿ being the proportional wage
income tax rate. We make the assumption that workers of all age cohorts have
the same productivity, face the same tax rate and receive the same entitlement
so vh(s;t) = vh(t) and yg(s;t) = yg(t) for all s. We let r(t) denote the real
instantaneous short-term interest rate, ½(> 0) the pure rate of time preference,








= [r(t) + µ]w(s;t) + vh(t)l(s;t) + yg(t) ¡ c(s;t)
and a transversality condition that prevents agents from going indeﬁnitely into
debt. The solution to the agent’s problem is given by
c(s;t) = (µ + ½)[h(s;t) + w(s;t)];














7Aggregating across all individuals, dropping the time index t and denoting per
capita aggregate variables by capital letters, we obtain
C = (µ + ½)[H + W]; (1)
BC
¯ L ¡ L
= vh; (2)
˙ H = (r + µ)H ¡ (Lvh + yg); (3)
˙ W = rW + Lvh + yg ¡ C; (4)
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. We note that although every
worker faces the same hourly pay, the fact that the members of the labor force are
of diﬀerent ages means that their wealth levels are diﬀerent, and consequently, the
number of hours worked will be diﬀerent across the diﬀerent age cohorts. We also
note from (3) and (4) that whereas the rate of interest used to discount after-tax
wage income and entitlement is (r +µ), aggregate non-human wealth accumulates
at rate r. It is this diﬀerence in discount rates that results in the non-neutrality
of debt and deﬁcits.
The government’s budget constraint can, in general, be expressed as
˙ D = rD + G + yg ¡ ¿Lvh; (5)
where D is the per capita level of government debt, G is the per capita amount
of government purchases, and tax revenue collected is entirely from wage income
taxation. For simplicity, we will throughout set G = 0. Assuming that, in equi-
librium, agents have zero holdings of private bonds, W ´ V + D, where V is the
total value of shares held by individuals. Taking the time derivative of (1), and
using (3) and (4), we obtain
˙ C = (µ + ½)[rW + (r + µ)H ¡ C]: (6)
Using (1) in (6), we obtain, after re-arrangement of terms,
˙ C
C
= (r ¡ ½) ¡
µ(µ + ½)[V + D]
C
: (7)
We now turn to the ﬁrms. We assume that each identically situated sym-
metric ﬁrm faces a technology that converts one unit of labor into one unit of
8output. Taking the wage rate, vf, as given, each ﬁrm i has to choose the price
at which to sell to its current customers or, equivalently, the output to supply
per customer to its consumers. Raising its price causes a decrease, and lowering
the price an increase, in the quantity demanded by its current customers accord-
ing to a per-customer demand relationship, D(pi=p;Cs). For simplicity, we as-
sume that D(¢) is homogeneous of degree one in total sales, Cs, and so we write
Csi = ´(pi=p)Cs; ´0(pi=p) < 0; ´(1) = 1. Each ﬁrm chooses the path of its real
price or, equivalently, the path of its supply per customer to its consumers, to
maximize the present discounted value of its cash ﬂows. The maximum at the ith
























The maximization is subject to the diﬀerential equation giving the motion of the
stock of customers of the ith ﬁrm as a function of its relative, or real, price given
by (8) below and an initial xi
0:
˙ xi = g(
pi
p
)xi; g0 < 0;g00 · 0; g(1) = 0: (8)





























m is the shadow price, or worth, of an additional customer. Another two
other necessary ﬁrst-order conditions (which are also suﬃcient under our assump-
tions) from solving the optimal control problem are:
˙ qi






















t = 0: (11)
We note that “marginal q” denoted qi
m is equal to “average q,” which we denote
9as qi
a ´ V i=xi, so qi
m = qi
a ´ qi.5
Now we move on to consider the economy’s general equilibrium. First, we
take note that in the closed economy, the aggregate stock of customers is a ﬁxed
constant given by the size of the population, which we have normalized to one.
Hence, in the closed economy, x = 1. Next, equating pi to p and setting qi = q in














; ´(1) = 1; ´0(1) < 0; g0(1) < 0: (12)
The expression in the square brackets in (12) is the algebraic excess of marginal
revenue over marginal cost, a negative value in customer-market models as the
ﬁrm supplies more than called for by the static monopolist’s formula for maximum
current proﬁt, giving up some of the maximum current proﬁt for the sake of its
longer-term interests. Deﬁning the average (gross) markup as m ´ 1=vf since















Equation (13) shows that the optimal markup depends negatively on what may
be called, Tobin’s Q, q=Cs—the ratio of the present discounted value of acquiring
an additional customer relative to the payoﬀ from current consumption. We write
m = Á(q=Cs), with Á0(q=Cs) < 0. An increase in q relative to Cs means that
proﬁts from future customers are high relative to payoﬀ from current consumption
so that each ﬁrm reduces its price (equivalently its markup) in order to increase
its customer base.
There is yet another way of expressing (12), which puts a focus on the labor
market, that will be useful for developing intuition for the results we obtain in
this paper. Noting our simple production technology, Cs = L, we can re-express
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t :
10(12) as saying that the representative ﬁrm’s real demand wage, v
f
demand, is nega-
















In a Marshallian employment-real wage diagram (see Figure 1), (14) gives a downward-
sloping labor demand curve, with q acting as a labor demand-shifter. An increase
in q, the shadow value attached to having an additional unit of the business asset—
here, a customer—leads ﬁrms to reduce their monopoly power and thus to increase
the demand wage.
The other schedule in this plane is the aggregate labor supply curve, which





¯ L ¡ L
; (15)
which says that the real supply wage, v
f
supply is positively related to employment,
L, given the tax rate and consumption. In the Marshallian employment-real wage
diagram, (15) gives an upward-sloping labor supply curve, with the parameter
representing the value of leisure (B), the tax rate (¿), and the level of consumption
demand (C) acting as labor supply shifters.
Putting together labor demand and supply, we see that a decrease in ¿ reduces
the tax wedge and consequently expands L. To understand the role played by C,




(1 + ¿)(µ + ½)B[q + D + H]
¯ L ¡ L
; (16)
where H is human wealth. We see from (16) that an increase in q raises the worker’s
non-human wealth and as a result raises the supply wage. Since an increase in q
increases labor demand but also decreases labor supply, can we determine what
the net eﬀect on employment is? To get the answer, we draw upon the condition
that, in the closed economy, equilibrium requires that total consumption demand
must be equal to the economy’s supply of the consumer good, an equilibration that
11is brought about through an adjustment in human wealth, H. Since Cs = L, we
can impose the goods market-clearing condition, C = Cs = L, in (15), and then
















¯ L ¡ L
; (17)
where L, we ﬁnd, is unambiguously increasing in q: an increase in q induces ﬁrms
to lower their markups, thus to raise the demand wage, and that eﬀect dominates
the wealth eﬀect on labor supply.6 We also make the observation from (17) that
since the optimal markup, 1=vf, chosen by ﬁrms depends on q=Cs so the demand
wage (given by the LHS of (17)) depends on q=L, and the supply wage (given
by the RHS of (17)) is increasing in L, an increase in q brings forth a less than
proportionate increase in L. Lastly, we note that the stock of public debt, D, does
not appear explicitly in (17) so its eﬀect on L works only indirectly through its
inﬂuence on q.7
We summarize these results in the following lemma:
LEMMA I: We obtain Cs = L = Ω(q;¿), with 0 < eq ´ dlnCs=dlnq < 1; where
eq denotes the elasticity of Cs with respect to q, and the partial derivative Ω¿ < 0.
Additionally, vf = V f(q;¿), with the partial derivatives V f
q > 0 and V f
¿ > 0.
6Suppose that we are initially at point A in Figure 1 where the level of consumption
demand (to which the supply wage curve is indexed) is initially equal to the level of output
supply. Let there be an increase in q. Looking at (14), we can infer the extent to which
the representative ﬁrm is willing to raise the demand wage, v
f
demand, at the original level of
L. Consider next how the supply wage curve shifts when q is increased. Suppose that at
the original level of L, v
f
supply is increased by the same amount as v
f
demand has increased so
that L is not changed. In this situation, however, consumption demand would exceed the
unchanged output supply. The term structure of interest must then adjust to reduce H to
make the supply wage curve intersect the demand wage curve at a point that is north-east
of point A so that C = Cs = L at a higher q.
7Given q, an increase in D raises consumption demand so that at the original em-
ployment level, consumption demand exceeds supply. The term structure of interest then
adjusts to cause H to fall by the increase in D so that C = Cs = L is restored.
12Equivalently, the equilibrium markup, m, can be expressed as m = (V f(q;¿))¡1 =
Ã(q;¿) with the partial derivatives Ãq < 0 and Ã¿ < 0.
It will sometimes be useful to use another reduced-form function for output
supply or equilibrium employment. For this alternative formulation, we note from
setting L = Cs in (17) that since the demand wage is increasing in ˆ q ´ q=Cs, and
the supply wage is increasing in L, therefore, L is increasing in ˆ q.
LEMMA II: Output supply, equal to employment, can alternatively be expressed
as Cs = L = Ψ(ˆ q;¿) with Ψˆ q > 0 and Ψ¿ < 0.
In a symmetric situation across ﬁrms, (10) simpliﬁes to
r =





+ g(1); g(1) = 0; (18)
after using vf = V f(q;¿) and Cs = Ω(q;¿). Equation (18) in the ﬁrm’s instanta-
neous rate of return to investment in its stock of assets, which are customers, is
an inter-temporal condition of capital-market equilibrium: it is entailed by correct
expectations of ˙ q and r at all future dates. We observe that with the q elasticity
of Cs being less than unity, and with an increase in q raising the unit cost, the
earnings-price ratio is unambiguously decreasing in q.
Finally, equating consumption demand to supply in (7), and noting that non-
human wealth is held in the form of shares and public debt and that ˙ Cs=Cs =
eq(˙ q=q), we obtain an expression for the consumer’s required rate of interest, r:
r = ½ +







; 0 < eq < 1: (19)
If we deﬁne the long-term (real) interest rate as the yield on consols paying a
constant coupon ﬂow of unity, and let R be their yield and hence R¡1 be their
price, arbitrage between short and long bonds gives the condition R = r +( ˙ R=R):
Equating required rate of interest in (19) to the market rate of return in (18), and
noting that g(1) = 0, we obtain, for given ﬁscal parameters, an expression for the
13size of capital gains (or loss):
˙ q
q
= (1 ¡ eq)¡1
"
½ +
µ(µ + ½)(q + D)
Ω(q;¿)
¡




To rule out multiple equilibria and focus on unique rational expectation paths, we
make the following assumption:





From (20), using assumption 1, we observe that the capital gain (˙ q=q) is increasing
in q, D and ¿. If we now substitute for the capital gain term in either (18) or (19)







µ(µ + ½)(q + D)
Ω(q;¿)
¡ eq




which makes the equilibrium interest rate or market rate of return an increasing
function of q, D and ¿.
LEMMA III: The natural interest rate function is given by the following: r =
Υ(q;D;¿) with the partial derivatives Υq > 0, ΥD > 0 and Υ¿ > 0.
An increase in the share price raises the price-earnings ratio, which (taken alone)
decreases the market rate of return, but this is associated with increased capital
gains, which dominates, so an increase in q raises the equilibrium interest rate.
Intuitively, the reason is that an increase of q raises the required rate of interest,
necessitating an increase in the rate of capital gain that more than compensates
for the decline in the earnings-price ratio.
We now study the economy’s equilibrium state given D > 0, yg > 0, and ¿ > 0.
We have the following lemma:
LEMMA IV: Given D, yg, and ¿, the rational expectations equilibrium is given
by a unique value of q, denoted qss, that makes the RHS of (20) equal to zero.
14Since the elasticity of Cs with respect to q is less than one, the RHS of (20) is
increasing in q. Applying the transversality condition, limt!1[exp
¡
R t
0 rsds qt] = 0,
the unique perfect foresight path of q requires that it be stationary at the value
that makes ˙ q = 0. Let the unique stationary level of q be denoted by qss.
To be explicit about the Wicksellian natural rate of interest that corresponds to
qss in the stationary equilibrium, it will be useful to develop a diagram using (18)
and (19) after setting ˙ q = 0. In Figure 2, the downward-sloping schedule gives
the market rate of return as a negative function of q while the upward-sloping
schedule, under assumption 1, gives the consumer’s required interest rate as a
positive function of q in a stationary equilibrium. We note that in the stationary
rational expectations equilibrium of this model, the Wicksellian natural rate of
interest is unambiguously positive. (Appendix A.1 shows that in the stationary
state, an increase in D increases the natural rate of interest.) Explicitly, the
stationary level of natural interest, rss, given D > 0 and ¿ > 0, is given by
rss =
[1 ¡ V f(qss;¿)]Ω(qss;¿)
qss
= ½ +
µ(µ + ½)(qss + D)
Ω(qss;¿)
> 0: (22)
We observe from (22) that in the stationary state, rss ¡ ½ > 0. Noting that
[dc(s;t)=dt]=c(s;t) = rss ¡ ½, and that given qss, the worker’s real wage is station-
ary, it must be the case that although aggregate consumption and aggregate labor
supply are both constant in the stationary state, individual agents are accumulat-
ing over their life and also planning to increase their leisure over their life.8
2. Eﬀects of a Future Debt Bomb
8A problem can arise in the stationary state of this model, as pointed out recently by
Guido Ascari and Neil Rankin (2004) in a diﬀerent context, that the demand for leisure
for some very wealthy individuals might exceed their time endowment, ¯ L. We avoid this
problem in two ways in our paper: ﬁrst, by considering expectational shocks that get the
economy out of the stationary state and that cause r to fall when asset prices decline,
possibly below the rate of time preference (see (21)), and thus lead individual economic
agents to decumulate wealth outside the stationary state; and second, by introducing
mandatory retirement into the model in section 4. Ascari and Rankin (2004) instead
propose to use a utility function that makes the demand for leisure independent of wealth.
15A. The Analysis
Let us now suppose that at t0, it is announced that at t1, there will be a
temporary tax cut, one that produces a big government deﬁcit over a small time
interval, that we dub a debt bomb. As a result of the temporary tax cut, the
stock of public debt is suddenly increased by the amount ∆ ´ parameter > 0. We
will explore the eﬀects of the debt bomb under two alternative modes of ﬁnancing,
one where the debt bomb is accommodated by cuts in entitlement spending at
t1 onwards and the other where subsequent wage income tax rates are raised to
re-balance the budget. To analyze the eﬀects on asset prices, interest rates, and
employment, it is convenient to refer to Figure 3, which depicts the stationary loci
of the following pair of equations:




[1 ¡ V f(q;¿)]
q=Ω(q;¿)
; (24)
where (23) is obtained by using r = Υ(q : D;¿) and T ´ ¿(1+¿)¡1V f(q;¿)Ω(q;¿)
in (5), and (24) is obtained by using r = Υ(q : D;¿) in (18).
The stationary q locus is downward sloping as an increase in D raises the
interest rate, which requires a lower q to raise the earnings-price ratio. Given D,
an increase in q above the stationary locus leads to capital gains while a decrease
leads to capital loss. As lemma 4 established, use of the transversality condition
implies that a rational expectations solution is a unique stationary q at given
D. What the negative slope of the stationary locus implies is that the unique
stationary q value is decreasing in the stock of public debt. We have the following
lemma:
LEMMA V: The unique stationary q, denoted qss, is decreasing in the stock of
public debt, D.
The stationary D locus can be either positively or negatively sloped. In the
empirically relevant case where a depressed stock market leads to rising debt-GDP
16ratios, as the implied collapse in labor demand leads both to a reduction in total
hours worked as well as hourly pay so tax revenue falls at given tax rates and the
size of the deﬁcit grows despite government interest cost savings, the stationary
D locus is positively sloped. Appendix A.2 establishes that both roots associated
with the dynamic system given by (23) and (24) are positive whether or not the
debt-GDP ratio rises when equity prices fall.
The economy is initially at point A with (D0
ss;q0
ss). Working backwards, let
us ask, “What is the value of q in the new stationary state after the debt bomb?”
Given the dynamic instability of the system, the new stationary state must be
attained precisely at t1. With the explosion of the public debt at t1 (the stock of
public debt is suddenly augmented by ∆), lemma 5 tells us that the new stationary
value of q is lower. The anticipation of the reduced future q, however, causes an
immediate drop in present q. The path taken by the economy from t0 onwards
is illustrated in Figure 3. Upon suddenly receiving the news of a future debt
bomb, therefore, asset prices fall immediately from q0
ss to qB, the value of q that
corresponds to point B in Figure 3, and the expected rate of change of q, i.e.,
the expected capital gains term, goes from zero to a negative value as market
participants form a rational expectation of further asset price declines.
As asset prices drop and continue a path of further decline until future time
t1, the government starts to lose tax revenue even before the temporary tax cut is
implemented so the stock of public debt begins to grow from t0 onwards. At t1,
the stock of public debt is suddenly augmented by the amount ∆ as a result of the
debt bomb. In order to retain solvency, we ﬁrst suppose that the whole constant
stream of entitlement spending is reduced from t1 onwards to accommodate the
debt bomb. (The reduction of yg from t1 onwards shifts the stationary D locus
rightwards to pass through point D in Figure 3.) In essence, public debt is now
substituted for social wealth (the present discounted value of the whole stream of
entitlements). In a non-Ricardian setup, the stream of government entitlements
is discounted at r + µ but non-human wealth accumulates at r. Consequently,
the substitution of public debt for social wealth makes consumers feel wealthier.
The stimulus to consumption demand raises the whole path of the short real rate
17of interest from t1 onwards and thus depresses asset price at t1. In anticipation,
present asset price is also reduced. We obtain the following proposition:
PROPOSITION I: Suppose that the economy is initially in a stationary state
with (D0
ss;q0
ss). At t0, there is a sudden announcement that at t1, there will be a
temporary tax cut causing a debt bomb. The government budget is re-balanced by
a subsequent cut in the constant stream of entitlement spending. The asset price
immediately drops and continues to fall until it reaches a permanently depressed
level. Employment immediately drops and steadily worsens from then on until it
reaches a lower plateau at t1.
In the alternative ﬁnancing scheme, the government raises the wage income tax
rate to re-balance the budget after the initial splash of public debt. (This also has
the eﬀect of shifting the stationary D locus to the right.) This increase in the tax
rate has the classic supply-side eﬀect of reducing hours worked through increasing
the tax wedge at given q. In addition, as the increase in tax rate reduces current
earnings on business assets from future time t1 onwards, there is a consequent
decline in q at t1. In anticipation, present q drops. We obtain the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION II: Suppose that the economy is initially in a stationary state
with (D0
ss;q0
ss). At t0, there is a sudden announcement that at t1, there will be a
temporary tax cut causing a debt bomb. The government budget is re-balanced
by a subsequent permanent increase in the wage income tax rate to service the
debt. The asset price immediately drops and continues to fall until it reaches a
permanently depressed level. Employment immediately drops and steadily worsens
from then on until, at t1, there is another abrupt drop to reach a lower plateau as
the tax rate is increased.9
9There is a discontinuous drop in output, and hence employment, at t1 because q does
not jump at t1 but the wage income tax rate is increased at that point to ﬁnance the
interest on increased debt. The negative supply-side eﬀect leads to the further decline in
employment at t1.
18For an equal-sized debt bomb, the size of the wealth eﬀect resulting from the
use of one method of ﬁnancing is, ex ante, the same as that resulting from the use
of the alternative method of ﬁnancing. To accommodate the debt bomb, human
wealth is reduced via a cut in the constant stream of government entitlements
in the one case and via a permanent increase in wage income tax rates in the
other case. However, there are deadweight losses associated with the imposition
of distortionary taxes on wage incomes which are not present with the cut of
government entitlements. (In the latter, there is only an income eﬀect whereas in
the former, there are both income and substitution eﬀects.) In particular, with
higher wage income tax rates, individual agents supply a sub-optimal number of
hours at work as leisure is made artiﬁcially cheap. As a result unit costs are
pushed up and current earnings on each unit of the business asset fall because
of the increase in the tax rate. Thus, for an equal-sized debt bomb, asset prices
fall further when solvency is retained through a permanent increase in the wage
income tax rate rather than through a cut in the constant stream of entitlement
spending.
It is also of some interest to ask what are the eﬀects of the future debt bomb
when Ricardian equivalence holds. This case is obtained in the formal model
simply by setting the parameter that represents the probability of death, µ, to
zero. We can readily establish the following proposition:
PROPOSITION III: Suppose that Ricardian equivalence holds, and that the econ-
omy is initially in a stationary state. At t0, there is a sudden announcement that at
t1, there will be a temporary tax cut causing a debt bomb. If the government bud-
get is re-balanced by a subsequent cut in entitlement spending, there is no eﬀect
on employment, asset price and interest rate. If, however, the government budget
is re-balanced by a subsequent increase in the wage income tax rate to service the
debt, the asset price immediately drops and continues to fall until it reaches a per-
manently depressed level. Employment immediately drops and steadily worsens
from then on until, at t1, there is another abrupt drop to reach a lower plateau as
the tax rate is increased.
19We ﬁnd, therefore, that even when Ricardian equivalence holds, if the future tax
cut is accommodated by a subsequent tax increase rather than entitlement reduc-
tions, there are also consequences for current earnings on the business asset, which
lead to a drop in the present asset price.
How can we infer the whole path of the Wicksellian natural rate of interest
in response to a future debt bomb in both the Ricardian and non-Ricardian cases
accompanied by either a cut in entitlement spending or an increase in the tax
rate to retain solvency? We note from (22) the initial value of r before the ex-
pectational shock occurs, setting µ = 0 in the Ricardian cases. Then at t0 when
the announcement is made, the value of q drops except in the case of Ricardian
equivalence accompanied by a cut in entitlement spending. (In that case, there is
no change in q as public debt serves as a perfect substitute for social wealth.) The
fall in share price increases the earnings-price ratio, which (taken alone) raises the
market rate of return but this is more than oﬀset by the anticipation of capital loss
so the short real rate of interest, in fact, falls as we can conﬁrm by inspecting (21).
Further inspection of (21) shows us that the further decline in q causes the short
real rate of interest to fall further although the gradual build-up of the stock of
public debt tends to attenuate the fall when Ricardian equivalence does not hold.
Thus it is very possible that the short real rate of interest will remain low for some
time between announcement and implementation.10
It is also worth pointing out that since the short rate, r, initially drops and may
10We have demonstrated theoretically that the drop in asset price coincides with a drop
in the short-term natural rate of interest. Is this relationship observed empirically? Do
we tend to see, say, in the past ﬁfteen years, a drop in the stock market being associated
with a drop in the short-term real interest rate, and a rise in the stock market associated
with an increase in the short-term real interest rate. We suggest that the answer is in the
aﬃrmative. A number of authors who have examined the behavior of the Federal Reserve
System since the mid-eighties onwards have argued that implicit inﬂation targeting by
the Fed has involved raising the short-term real interest rate as a means of dampening
aggregate demand when asset prices increased (see Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler, 1999;
Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali and Gertler, 2000). When stock prices fell in 2001, the Fed
lowered the short-term real interest rate in a series of cuts to stimulate aggregate demand.
20continue to fall (until t1) in response to the sudden news of a future debt bomb,
the depressed stock market could be accompanied by an initial decline in the long
rate, R. Recall that arbitrage ensures R = r + ( ˙ R=R). If the term structure is
downward sloping at announcement, R unambiguously falls below r since ˙ R=R < 0.
If the term structure is upward sloping at announcement so ˙ R=R > 0, it is still
possible that R initially drops if r falls by more than the rate of capital loss on
holding a long bond, where R¡1 is the price of the long-term bond. Hence the
paradox of employment contraction does not result from nor imply any immediate
increase of the long real interest rate, contrary to the view held by some ﬁnancial
commentators.11
B. Behavior of Inﬂation-Targeting Central Bank
Let us explore how an inﬂation-targeting central bank adopting a Taylor rule
would behave in a ﬁscal environment characterized by the future-dated shock just
studied. In order to study monetary policy in a world with short-run price-level
sluggishness, we now introduce to our basic model the AS equation that would
result from the Calvo (1983) staggered pricing model and an expectational AD
equation, and suppose that the central bank uses the Taylor rule for setting the
short-term nominal rate of interest. Letting zt represent the output gap, the key




where ± denotes the (constant) probability that a ﬁrm receives a signal to reset its
price. The expectational AD equation expressed in terms of the output gap, zt,
can be written as
dzt
dt
= it ¡ ¼e
t ¡ rNt; (26)
where ¼e
t is the expected rate of inﬂation, it is the short term nominal interest rate
set by the central bank, and rNt is the Wicksellian natural rate of interest. Under
11See the editorial entitled, “The Demise of Rubinomics,” in the Wall Street Journal
(August 28, 2002).
21perfect foresight, one can write ¼e = ¼ in (26). Let us write the Taylor rule as
it = ¯ it + a(¼t ¡ ¯ ¼) + bzt; (27)
where a and b are positive constants and ¯ ¼ is the inﬂation target. Substituting
(27) into (26), and setting ¼e = ¼, we obtain
dzt
dt
= ¯ it ¡ a¯ ¼ ¡ Υ(q;D;¿) + (a ¡ 1)¼t + bzt; (28)
after replacing rN with the function rN = Υ(q;D;¿); Υq > 0, ΥD > 0 and Υ¿ > 0.
Equations (25), (28) and (20) provide a system of dynamic equations in the
three variables: ¼, z and q. We can readily check that the determinant of the
matrix associated with this system of equations evaluated around ¼ = ¯ ¼, z = 0
and q = qss is given by ±2Π(a ¡ 1), where Π deﬁned in appendix A.3 is positive.
Hence the determinant would be positive if and only if the Taylor principle holds,
namely, that a > 1. The trace is given by (b + Π) > 0. Appendix A.3 provides
proof that the three roots are positive so that with all three variables being jumpy,
we obtain a unique rational expectations equilibrium with ¼t = ¯ ¼, zt = 0 and
q = qss. Consequently, the equilibrium is characterized by the economy operating
at the natural rate of output, and the required path of the short-term nominal
interest rate is given by it = rNt+¯ ¼. By adjusting the short-term nominal interest
rate to reﬂect changes in the natural rate of interest, the economy’s actual output
path completely reﬂects movements in the natural output path.
In response to the expectational shock, we have observed that the Wicksel-
lian natural rate of interest drops immediately and may steadily decline between
announcement and actual implementation. An inﬂation targeting central bank,
therefore, would implement a whole series of interest rate cuts ahead of t1 in such
a scenario. One factor behind the sequence of interest rate cuts adopted by the
Fed in 2001 to mid-2004 may, therefore, have something to do with the depressed
stock market brought about by the market’s expectations of the future tax shock.12
12The future pension beneﬁt explosion that we study in section 4 would have similar
consequences.
22Since there is a lower bound for the nominal interest rate, we see that if the nat-
ural rate of interest falls too far into negative territory, it could cause a liquidity
trap problem. (See Gauti Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) for a discussion of how
optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy should be conducted when a real disturbance
brings the economy into a liquidity trap.)
3. Tax Cuts with Gradual Welfare Payment Adjustment
A. Conditions for Fiscal Sustainability
We now turn to study the eﬀects of future and immediate tax cuts without
the sunset provision, that is, future and immediate permanent tax cuts. This
immediately raises the question of whether the proposed ﬁscal changes are sus-
tainable in the sense that the debt-income ratio will not explode when account is
taken of all the general-equilibrium eﬀects resulting from the proposed tax cuts
(see Blanchard, et al. (1990) for the concept of the sustainability of ﬁscal pol-
icy). We ensure ﬁscal sustainability by requiring that, for a given tax rate, the
primary (non-interest) surplus is made a suﬃciently responsive positive function
of the debt-income ratio. Conversely, the primary deﬁcit is reduced suﬃciently
as the debt-income ratio rises in order to retain solvency. We show that it is not
possible to launch a ﬁscally sustainable permanent tax cut while keeping welfare
spending constant as a share of GDP. The extent to which policy-makers must
reduce the primary (non-interest) deﬁcit, such as through cutting government en-
titlement programs, depends upon how much a decrease in asset prices decreases
the tax revenue to GDP ratio compared to how much it lowers government interest
debt burden. In a recent study, Henning Bohn (1998) found signiﬁcant evidence
that for the US the primary surplus taken as a ratio to GDP is an increasing func-
tion of the debt-GDP ratio (after controlling for war-time spending and cyclical
ﬂuctuations) for 1916-1995 and various subperiods. His estimates of the increase
in (non-interest) primary surplus in response to a unit increase in the debt-income
ratio range from 0.028 to 0.054 for various sub-periods, with 0.054 for the whole
period.
23Making the assumption of gradual welfare payment adjustment in response to
growing budgetary deﬁcits, it turns out to be convenient to examine a dynamic
system where asset price, q; and per capita debt, D; are normalized by GDP per
business asset. Deﬁning then ˆ D ´ D=Cs; ˆ yg ´ yg=Cs, and ˆ q ´ q=Cs, where ˆ q has
the interpretation of real asset price normalized by GDP per business asset (which
is here a customer) or the stock market capitalization as a ratio to GDP, and ˆ D
gives the debt-GDP ratio, we modify (5) and (20), respectively, to yield
˙ ˆ D = ¹(ˆ q; ˆ D) ˆ D + ˆ yg ¡ ˆ T(ˆ q;¿); (29)
˙ ˆ q
ˆ q
= ¹(ˆ q; ˆ D) ¡
[1 ¡ (Á(ˆ q))¡1]
ˆ q
; (30)
where r¡eq[˙ q=q] = ½+µ(µ+½)[ˆ q+ ˆ D] ´ ¹(ˆ q; ˆ D), which gives the interest rate net
of GDP growth. We see that it is increasing in ˆ q and ˆ D so ¹ˆ q > 0 and ¹ ˆ D > 0.
Note also that the tax revenue to GDP ratio is given by ¿(1 + ¿)¡1V f(q;¿) =
¿(1 + ¿)¡1(Á(ˆ q))¡1 ´ ˆ T(ˆ q;¿); ˆ Tˆ q > 0, ˆ T¿ > 0. To obtain (29) and (30), we have
also used the relationships ˙ ˆ q=ˆ q ´ [1 ¡ eq](˙ q=q); and m ´ (vf)¡1 = Á(ˆ q).
To ﬁnd the condition for ﬁscal sustainablity, we ﬁrst take note that if the pri-
mary surplus (normalized by GDP) given by ˆ T ¡ˆ ys; where ˆ T ´ ¿(1+¿)¡1(Á(ˆ q))¡1
is independent of the debt-GDP ratio, ˆ D, the steady state of the linearized system
given by (29) and (30) is globally unstable so any increase in the debt-GDP ratio
above its steady-state value will cause it to increase without bound. Therefore, if
the entitlement spending to GDP ratio is held invariant to changes in the debt-
GDP ratio, a permanent tax cut would be ﬁscally unsustainable.13 The proof is
in appendix A.4.
To achieve ﬁscal sustainability, we make the (normalized) primary surplus an
increasing function of ˆ D, as the empirical work of Bohn (1998) suggests has been
13We would also point out that in the Ricardian equivalence case where µ = 0, the
interest rate net of GDP growth is simply given by a parameter, ½, and so is independent
of ˆ q and ˆ D. In this case, we would replace the function ¹ in (29) and (30) by the parameter,
½. We arrive at the same conclusion that if entitlement spending taken as a ratio to GDP
is held invariant to changes in the debt-income ratio, ﬁscal policy is also unsustainable in
the Ricardian equivalence case.
24the US practice in the past, so we let entitlement spending as a ratio to GDP
decline as the debt-income ratio increases and write ˆ ys = Φ( ˆ D); Φ0( ˆ D) < 0 since
we want to keep ¿ as a policy parameter. In appendix A.5, we show that the
extent to which entitlement spending as a ratio to GDP has to shrink as the debt-
GDP ratio rises depends on the extent to which tax revenue to GDP ratio declines
relative to interest cost savings when asset prices decline.
In the empirically relevant case where a depressed stock market leads to rising
debt-income ratios, as the implied collapse in labor demand leads both to a decline
in employment as well as wage earnings so tax revenue falls at given tax rates and
enlarges the ﬁscal deﬁcit despite interest cost savings, we ﬁnd that in order to
achieve saddle-path stability, and hence achieve ﬁscal sustainability in response to























We show this case in Figure 4.
B. Eﬀects of Future and Immediate Tax Cuts Without Sunset Provision
We now establish two propositions in the case of sustainable ﬁscal policy under
the assumption that depressed asset prices lead to a rising debt-GDP ratio (at given
tax rates) as the loss in tax revenue exceeds any interest cost savings. The ﬁrst
concerns a future permanent tax cut; the second concerns an immediate permanent
tax cut.
PROPOSITION IV: Suppose that the economy is initially in a stationary state
with ( ˆ D0
ss, ˆ q0
ss). At t0 = 0, there is an announcement that at t1 = T, the wage
income tax rate will be cut permanently from ¿0 to ¿1, ¿1 < ¿0. This leaves the
real asset price normalized by GDP per business asset (ˆ q) permanently depressed
notwithstanding the positive supply-side eﬀect so employment could either con-
tract or expand in the long run. Asset prices fall between announcement and
implementation with the result that employment and output contract between t0
and t1 and the debt-GDP ratio steadily rises throughout.
25We observe from (30) that the stationary ˆ q locus does not shift in response to
a tax cut. On the other hand, the stationary ˆ D locus shifts up since, at a given
debt-income ratio and a given size of welfare spending relative to GDP, higher
asset prices are required to generate additional tax revenues to oﬀset the direct
loss of tax revenue owing to the tax cut. The result of the curve shift is that the
new stationary level of ˆ qss is lower and ˆ Dss is higher at ( ˆ D1
ss; ˆ q1
ss). Intuitively, the
pile up of debt resulting from the tax cut leads to higher short real rates of interest
in the new stationary state. As a result, the new stationary ˆ qss must be reduced
to generate a higher market rate of return to match the higher interest rate. To
infer what happens to employment, L, we refer to lemma 2, where we have the
result that L is increasing in ˆ q through its inﬂuence on markups and decreasing in
¿ through its supply side inﬂuence. Although employment in the new stationary
state expands on account of reduced tax rates, it contracts on account of depressed
stock market capitalization as a ratio to GDP, a depression that is brought about
by a swollen debt-income ratio and resulting higher future short real interest rates.
How does the market respond today in anticipation of the prospective per-
manent tax cut? We leave to appendix A.6 to prove that for small changes, the
Feldstein-Rubin-Summers consequences of higher future short rates overwhelms
the positive supply-side eﬀect of a lower wage income tax rate. As a result, stock
market capitalization as a ratio to GDP (ˆ q) drops in anticipation of the future
permanent tax cut and current economic activity declines. We illustrate the econ-
omy’s response to the future permanent tax cut in Figure 5. We show that the
prospective tax cut leads to an immediate decline in ˆ q from point A to point B at
t0, and continues to fall further from point B to point C, which it reaches at t1,
the time of implementation.14 Hence, employment contracts between announce-
ment and implementation. At t1, both the asset price as well as the level of debt
cannot jump but the tax cut itself leads to an increase in output supply through
the positive supply-side eﬀect, which causes ˆ q ´ q=Ω(q;¿) and ˆ D ´ D=Ω(q;¿) to
14Note that at t0, the level of debt does not jump while the fall in asset price leads to a
fall in output so the debt-GDP ratio rises. Consequently, point B lies south-east of point
A.
26drop equiproportionately so moving from point C to point D along the ray OX.
From that point onwards, the economy travels along the negatively-sloped saddle
path to reach a new stationary state with higher debt-GDP ratio and lower market
capitalization as a ratio to GDP.
PROPOSITION V: Suppose that the economy is initially in a stationary state
with ( ˆ D0
ss, ˆ q0
ss). At t0 = 0, there is an immediate cut in the wage income tax
rate that is understood by all to be permanent, going from ¿0 to ¿1, ¿1 < ¿0.
The real asset price normalized by GDP per business asset (ˆ q) immediately drops
and continues to fall until it reaches a permanently depressed level. The debt-
GDP ratio steadily rises throughout. The immediate impact on employment is
ambiguous but it steadily worsens from then on until it reaches a plateau that can
either be above or below the original reference path.
In appendix A.6, we show that the extent of the initial drop of the stock market
capitalization as a ratio to GDP (ˆ q) is inversely related to how far away in time
the tax cut will be implemented, T. In other words, the depressing eﬀect on ˆ q
is stronger the earlier is the future event. Recall that L is increasing in ˆ q and
decreasing in ¿. So hours worked is pulled up by the direct Marshallian impact
of the (immediate) decrease of ¿ on the demand wage; this is the eﬀect relied on
by the supply siders. But hours worked is pushed down by the (proportionately
greater) drop in ˆ q whose depressing eﬀect on the demand wage (vh) through its
impact on markups dominates the resulting wealth eﬀect on labor supply. (The
increased exercise of monopoly power has unambiguously the net eﬀect of reducing
economic activity.) In terms of Figure 5, which we used to illustrate the case of
a delayed permanent tax cut, ˆ q immediately jumps down to a point on the new
saddle-path associated with the new stationary state ( ˆ D1
ss; ˆ q1
ss).15
4. Prospective Pension Problem in the Model with Retirement
15Note that with immediate implementation at t0, the level of debt does not jump while
the fall in asset price leads to a fall in output so the debt-GDP ratio rises. Consequently,
the point on the new saddle-path lies south-east of point A.
27We introduce mandatory retirement into our basic model so that an agent only
works for a length of time tW after he is born. Hence an agent born at time s
receives a wage income at time t of vh(t)l(s;t) if t < s + tW and he receives a
time-invariant retirement beneﬁt of bg if t ¸ s + tW. The share of retirees in the
population at time t is equal to
R t¡tW
¡1 µe¡µ(t¡s)ds = e¡µtW, and the share of the
population in the workforce is 1 ¡ e¡µtW. Supposing that there are only payroll
taxes imposed to ﬁnance the retirement beneﬁts, the only form of government
expenditure here, the government budget constraint is simply given by
(1 ¡ e¡µtW)¿Lvh = e¡µtWbg; (31)
where (1 ¡ e¡µtW)L is total hours worked and L is hours per worker.
Following Nielsen (1994), we can show that the equation replacing (7) that



















Noting that vhL ´ vfL ¡ ¿vhL and using (31), we have vhL ¡ bg = vfL ¡ (1 ¡
e¡µtW)¡1bg, which we can use in (32) to obtain
˙ C
C















Equating consumption demand to supply, noting that ˙ Cs=Cs = eq[˙ q=q], and






















28where we note that with retirement introduced into the model, Cs = Ω(q;¿;e¡µtW)
and vf = V f(q;¿;e¡µtW): In appendix A.7, we show that an increase in the share of
retirees in the population contracts Cs and increases vf given q and ¿. The reason
an increase in the share of retirees in the population, e¡µtW, contracts output and
raises unit cost at given ¿ and q is that it acts to shift the aggregate labor supply
curve to the left so moving up the downward-sloping aggregate labor demand curve
in the ((1 ¡ e¡µtW)L;vf) plane.
Starting from the assumption of the basic model that the share of retired people
in the population is initially zero, let us consider the eﬀect of a sudden anticipation
that at future time t1, there will occur a sudden increase in the share of retired
people in the population. It is straightforward to see from the budget constraint in
(31) that the tax rate will then have to be raised to pay for beneﬁts to the retired,
hence depressing asset prices at t1 through lowering current earnings on business
assets. In addition, there is another channel acting to depress asset prices. With
more people retired, the size of the labor force shrinks and that also acts, at given
q, to raise unit cost and thus to reduce quasi-rents, and as a consequence asset
prices fall.
To analyze the eﬀects on the whole path of asset prices, interest rates, and
employment, it is convenient to refer to Figure 6, which plots the LHS of (34),
(1 ¡ eq)˙ q=q, against q with the share of retirees in the population initially equal
to zero. The initial stationary level of q is equal to q
A
ss. The increase in the wage
income tax rate and increase in the share of retirees in the population both shift
the positively-sloped schedule to the left, leading to a lower level of stationary
q via the two channels described above. However, the increase in the share of
retirees in the population also works through the presence of the last term on the
RHS of (34) to attenuate the leftward shift of the positively-sloped schedule. We
observe that this last term, arising from introducing retirement into the original
Blanchard (1985) model, acts like a subtractor from non-human wealth, which
leads to a fall in the consumer’s required rate of interest. This eﬀect tends to
shift the positively-sloped schedule to the right. Overall, if a suﬃciently big rise in
tax rates is required to ﬁnance retirement beneﬁts in the future and the shrinkage
29of the labor force is signiﬁcant enough, the net eﬀect is a leftward shift of the
positively-sloped schedule. As there can only be one initial jump in q, i.e. at t0,
and the economy must be at the value of q that makes ˙ q = 0 at t1 (namely, at q
C
ss
in Figure 6), the path taken by the economy after the initial jump is given by BC
along the old schedule in Figure 6. Upon receiving the news of a future bulge in




expected rate of change of q, i.e., the expected capital gains term, goes from zero to
a negative value as market participants form a rational expectation of further asset
price declines. In fact, asset prices continue to decline at an increasing rate until t1
when ˙ q jumps up from a negative value (on the old schedule) to zero (on the new
schedule). The stock market value cannot jump at the time of implementation,
t1, to avoid the possibility of making anticipated inﬁnite rates of capital gain or
loss. The implied paths taken by the current short-term real interest rate and
employment, which equals output, are given in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION VI: With the sudden news at t0 that there will be a rise in the
share of retirees in the population producing a bulge in retirement beneﬁts that
have to be paid for by permanently higher wage income tax rates at future time
t1, there is an immediate drop in the short real rate of interest, after which it falls
steadily between t0 and t1. At t1, it jumps to a plateau whose level lies below
its pre-shock level. Employment, which equals output, immediately drops and
continues its decline until, at t1, there is another abrupt drop to reach a lower
plateau as the tax rate is increased to ﬁnance retirement beneﬁts.16
16That the new stationary short real rate of interest is below its pre-shock level can be
seen as follows: in the stationary state, the short rate of return is inversely related to the
stock market capitalization as a ratio to GDP, ˆ q ´ q=Ω. (The term 1 ¡ V f can be re-
expressed as (m ¡ 1)=m, where one reduced-form expression of the markup is m = Á(ˆ q).)
From (34), an increase in the share of retirees in the population, e¡µtW, from an initial
value of zero to a positive number requires an increase in ˆ q to keep ˙ q=q equal to zero.
Consequently, the short real rate of interest in the new stationary state must be below
its pre-shock level. That the new stationary ˆ q is higher while the corresponding new
stationary q is lower means that output supply falls by proportionately more than q falls
305. Concluding Remarks
The supply-siders’ thesis that employment activity is predominantly driven
by changes in the tax wedge is empirically not the great success that is widely
supposed. Casey Mulligan (2002) attempts to establish the part played by public
ﬁnance distortion in the movements of the supply of labor of American workers
over nearly a century, 1889-1996, using the familiar neoclassical model of labor-
leisure choice. This leads to the ﬁrst-order condition MRS(C; ¯ L¡L) = vh, where
MRS is the marginal value of time, which is increasing in both consumption C and
hours worked L, and vh is the after-tax hourly wage. The latter is related to the
ﬁrms’ demand wage, vf, and to the wage income tax rate, ¿, by vh ´ (1 + ¿)¡1vf
and, invoking pure competition, vf is equated to the marginal product of labor,
MPL, which is increasing in capital stock, K, and decreasing in L. Consequently,
MRS(C; ¯ L ¡ L) = (1 + ¿)¡1MPL.17 It follows that, given C and K, an increase
in ¿ requires a decrease of L. Mulligan observes from his empirical exercise that
the distortion, deﬁned as the gap (MPL=MRS)¡1, is indeed correlated with the
ﬁscal wedge, deﬁned as (1 + ¿) ¡ 1. But he further observes that the distortions
measured in the Great Depression, the Second World War and the 1980s are not
well explained by the current ﬁscal wedge. He concludes that the within-decade ag-
gregate ﬂuctuations in consumption, wages, and labor supply are hard to reconcile
with this simple competitive equilibrium model of labor supply and demand.
The present paper has brought in an additional factor: the role of the shadow
price attaching to the ﬁrm’s business asset—in the illustrative model used here,
the customer. The ﬁrms’ inter-temporal perspective makes their current markup
via the negative supply side eﬀect of higher tax rates and the contraction of labor force
through retirement eﬀect.
17In principle, the consumption tax rate, say ¿c, also appears on the right-hand side, so
MRS(C; ¯ L¡L) = [(1¡¿c)=(1+¿)]MPL. However, with the assumed functional form in
Mulligan (2002) as well as in our paper, it is possible to write MRS(C=(1¡¿c); ¯ L¡L) =
(1+¿)¡1MPL, so that when the measure of consumption used is inclusive of consumption
taxes, we do not expect consumption taxes to create a gap between measured MRS and
MPL.
31m inversely related to q, the shadow price that ﬁrms attach to a customer, and
also an inverse function of the wage income tax rate ¿, m = Ã(q;¿); Ãq < 0 and
Ã¿ < 0. In this imperfectly competitive framework the analogue to Mulligan’s
labor-equilibrium relationship is MRS(C; ¯ L ¡ L) = (1 + ¿)¡1[Ã(q;¿)]¡1MPL, in
which an increase of q pulls up the right-hand side (i.e., vh) and thus induces an
increase in hours supplied. The distortive gap, MPL=MRS, is now driven by
(1 + ¿)Ã(q;¿). Given q, an increase of ¿ increases the distortive gap through the
(1 + ¿) term but indirectly decreases the gap through the markup term. Because
of these two oﬀsetting eﬀects of a change in ¿ on the distortive gap, one can-
not expect to understand well the medium-term responses of employment (here
hours) to wage income tax changes without considering the asset price responses
to such shocks.18 For example, in our framework, an increase in the tax rates
introduced in the mid-1990s under the Clinton administration may have helped
to boost employment, contrary to what would be predicted by Mulligan’s com-
petitive equilibrium framework, precisely because the expectation of a decline in
the debt-GDP ratio boosted asset prices and thus reduced ﬁrms’ markups. Our
channel, from tax increase to the demand for labor, through which a pay-down of
the public debt (relative to income) lowers future short rates and elevates asset
prices, including the shadow price of customers, q, whichever way it aﬀects short
rates, could have pulled up vh and L more than the contractionary supply-side
eﬀect from the increase of ¿ pushed them down.
We believe that our framework, by introducing a role for asset prices in the
18With a utility function such as logC + [B=(1 ¡ ´¡1)](¯ L ¡ L)1¡´
¡1
, where ´¡1 gives
the constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of leisure, an increase in (1 + ¿)m
brings about a smaller increase in the demand for leisure at any given level of consumption
demand the smaller ´¡1 is. Robert Hall (1997) uses the value ´¡1 = 0:6 in his numerical
simulation while Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) use ´¡1 = 1:3 in their baseline simula-
tion. The latter cite studies showing that estimated values of the inter-temporal elasticity
of substitution of leisure for males are typically near zero while many studies obtain es-
timates for female workers that fall within the range 0.5-1.5 with two being the upper
bound. Our theoretical model in the text assumes ´¡1 = 1 as also is done by Edward
Prescott (2002) in his Ely lecture.
32fundamental labor-equilibrium condition, also helps to throw light on some puzzles
found by Mulligan in his study of labor-leisure distortions at medium-term frequen-
cies within the competitive equilibrium framework. For example, he found that
tax distortions alone could not quantitatively explain the gap between MRS and
MPL during the Great Depression. “What drove a 40% [gap] between marginal
product and value of time?” he asks. We answer that the part of the increase of
MPL=MRS during 1929-33 that cannot be explained by an increase in tax rate is
attributable to a decline in asset prices, such as a depressed value placed on a cus-
tomer, which increases ﬁrms’ markups. The recent paper by Varadarajan Chari,
et al. (2002) similarly fails to incorporate a role for asset prices in explaining the
gap between MRS and MPL during the Great Depression.
Mulligan also found that despite an increase in federal tax rates from practi-
cally zero to more than 20% during World War II, leisure during the second world
war is lower than implied by the labor-equilibrium condition given by the compet-
itive equilibrium model. Our model suggests that this may be attributable to the
fact, highlighted by Mankiw (1985), that the real interest rate was low during the
war. Theoretically, the low wartime real interest rate can be explained either by
Mankiw’s own introduction of consumer durables into the standard neoclassical
growth model or by the introduction of the diﬀerences in relative labor intensive-
ness in the consumer and capital-good producing sectors (see Phelps, 1994). In the
former case, an increase in government spending on the aggregative good, which
drives capital used in the domestic sector into the commercial sector so reducing
the marginal product of capital, and in the latter case, an increase in government
spending on the relatively labor-intensive capital good, reduces the real interest
rate, and raises asset prices, including the shadow prices ﬁrms place on their oper-
ating business assets, such as their customers. This counteracts the distortionary
33eﬀects of increased federal income tax rates.19
Finally, Mulligan pointed out that the falling distortive gap during the Reagan
years could not be fully explained by the decrease in federal labor income tax
rates in the 1980s. Although the Feldstein-Rubin-Summers channel would imply
that the stock market should decline if agents formed expectations of a build-up of
public debt, authors such as Blanchard and Summers (1984) have argued that in
the early eighties, the ﬁscal expansion in the US was oﬀset by the ﬁscal contraction
in the other major OECD countries so that the aggregate inﬂation-adjusted deﬁcit
as a percent of the group’s GNP did not change signiﬁcantly. They pointed to
the strong stock market performance in the 1980s and the strong behavior of
investment in the face of increased real interest rates as evidence of a favorable
shift in expected proﬁtability. If that inference is correct, the consequent rise in
the value placed on customers would cause markups to fall, and thus reduce the
distortive gap beyond what was brought about by reduced wage income tax rates.
How well does our model help to explain recent US experience starting from
the internet boom from 1995/96? If future prospects of an upward lift to produc-
tivity made possible by technological advance in information and communications
technology caused the boom, their materialization with a string of outsized produc-
tivity gains starting in 2001 should have stabilized the stock market at late-1990s
levels and brought employment down for a soft landing at its pre-boom 1996 level.
But that was not exactly what occurred. Instead, the stock market suﬀered a
deep decline until regaining in 2003 and 2004 its 1998 level; correspondingly, the
unemployment rate, participation rate and work week all overshot considerably
their 1996 marks before achieving a mixed recovery by 2004: unemployment back
to its 1996 level but participation and hours still markedly below their 1996 levels.
The explanation that the analysis here oﬀers (on top of others such as overinvest-
19Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) adduce evidence in support of a decline in markups
when government purchases increase, including during the two world wars, but they use a
diﬀerent model of dynamic markups from ours. They also acknowledge that the imposition
of price controls during World War II places a limitation on one’s interpretation of the
data.
34ment and 9/11) is that the tax cut in 2001 with its backloading feature along with
mounting awareness of the bulge in retirement beneﬁts threatening tax rates even
above pre-cut levels caused a drop in the stock market starting in 2001, which re-
duced the demand wage and hours per worker. The low short rates of real interest
that we have observed since 2001 are a further consequence. From our struc-
turalist perspective, it comes as no great surprise that the buildup in 2001-2003
of ﬁscal stimulus and central bank interest rate cuts did not succeed by 2004 in
staving oﬀ the economy’s fall back to pre-boom levels or worse. The reduction of
certain marginal tax rates may have had structural impacts every bit as eﬀective
as econometric estimates have led us to believe yet the former impacts may have
failed to outweigh appreciably, if at all, their perverse impact in worsening the
already alarming prospects for future ﬁscal deﬁcits.
35APPENDIX
A.1. To prove that the stationary level of natural interest is increasing in D,
we note that setting ˙ q = 0 in (18), we obtain a negatively-sloping relationship
relating the RHS of (18) to q (see Figure 2). Next, turning to (19), setting ˙ q = 0
and using assumption 1 gives a positively-sloping relationship relating the RHS of
(19) to q. Increasing D shifts the positively-sloping relationship upwards, hence
leftwards. The result is that the value of q corresponding to the intersection
declines. Substituting the lower value of q back into (18) with ˙ q=q = 0, we see that
the new stationary level of natural interest is now higher.
A.2. Technically, the trace of the 2 £ 2 matrix associated with the linearized
dynamic system given below is positive, and the determinant is also positive:
[ ˙ D ˙ q]0 = A[D ¡ Dss q ¡ qss]0;
where [¢¢¢]0 denotes a column vector, the system (23) and (24) is linearized around
the stationary-state values, Dss and qss, and the 2 £ 2 matrix A contains the
following elements:
a11 ´ Υ + ΥDDss;
a12 ´ ΥqDss ¡ Tq;
a21 ´ ΥDqss;
a22 ´ qss[Υq +









We can readily check that a11 > 0, a21 > 0 and a22 > 0 while a12 can either be
positive or negative. (Consequently, the trace of A (Tr(A)) is clearly positive.) The
sign of a12 depends upon the relative inﬂuence of a change in q on the tax revenue
on the one hand, and the interest cost on the other hand. If a rise in the asset
price raises the tax revenue by more than it raises the interest cost so a booming
stock market leads to declining debt or, conversely, a depressed stock market leads
to rising debt, then a12 is negative, and the determinant of A (Det(A)), equal to
a11a22 ¡ a21a12, is clearly positive. In the alternative case when a12 is positive,
36we can check that (a11=a12) > (a21=a22) so once again the determinant of A is
positive. Therefore, the system represented by (23) and (24) is globally unstable.
If the eigenvalues associated with the system represented by (23) and (24) are
denoted ¸1 and ¸2, we have that ¸1¸2 = a11a22 ¡ a12a21 > 0.
A.3. The matrix associated with the equation system given by (25), (28) and (20)
evaluated around the steady state has the elements: a11 = 0;a12 = ¡±2;a13 =
0;a21 = a ¡ 1;a22 = b;a23 = ¡Υq;a31 = 0;a32 = 0;a33 = Π, where
Π ´ qss[Υq +









The determinant of the matrix is given by Det ´ ±2Π(a¡1), which is positive if and
only if the Taylor principle holds, that is, a > 1. The trace is given by Tr ´ b+Π,
which is positive. By an application of Routh theorem, the number of roots of the
polynomial, ¡°3 +°2Tr¡[bΠ+±2(a¡1)]° +Det, with positive real parts will be
equal to the number of variations of sign in the scheme ¡1 Tr ¡ [bΠ + ±2(a ¡
1)] + [Det=Tr] Det. We can readily check that ¡[bΠ + ±2(a ¡ 1)] + [Det=Tr] =
¡[(b + Π)bΠ + b±2(a ¡ 1)](b + Π)¡1 < 0. Consequently, there are exactly three
changes in sign, implying that there are exactly three positive roots.
A.4. We prove that if entitlement spending as a ratio to GDP is left invariant to a
change in the debt-GDP ratio, ﬁscal policy is unsustainable. Technically, the trace
of the 2 £ 2 matrix associated with the linearized dynamic system given below is
positive, and the determinant is also positive:
[ ˙ ˆ D ˙ ˆ q]0 = A[ ˆ D ¡ ˆ Dss ˆ q ¡ ˆ qss]0;
where [¢¢¢]0 denotes a column vector, the system (29) and (30) is linearized around
the stationary-state values, ˆ Dss and ˆ qss, and the 2 £ 2 matrix A contains the
following elements:
a11 ´ ¹ + ¹ ˆ D
ˆ Dss;
a12 ´ ¹ˆ q ˆ Dss ¡ ˆ Tˆ q;
37a21 ´ ¹ ˆ Dˆ qss;
a22 ´ ¹ + ¹ˆ qˆ qss ¡ (Á(ˆ qss))¡2Á0(ˆ qss):
We can readily check that a11 > 0, a21 > 0 and a22 > 0 while a12 can either be
positive or negative. (Consequently, the trace of A (Tr(A)) is clearly positive.) The
sign of a12 depends upon the relative inﬂuence of a change in ˆ q on the tax revenue-
GDP ratio on the one hand, and the interest debt burden on the other hand. If a
rise in the stock market capitalization relative to GDP raises the tax revenue-GDP
ratio by more than it raises the real interest cost so a booming stock market leads
to declining debt-income ratios or, conversely, a depressed stock market leads to
rising debt-income ratios, then a12 is negative, and the determinant of A (Det(A)),
equal to a11a22 ¡ a21a12, is clearly positive. In the alternative case when a12 is
positive, we can check that (a11=a12) > (a21=a22) so once again the determinant
of A is positive. More concretely, we can show that, whether a12 > 0 or a12 < 0,
we obtain Det(A) ´ ¹¹ˆ qˆ qss+¹ ˆ Dˆ qss ˆ Tˆ q +[¹¡(Á0=Á2)][¹ ˆ D ˆ Dss+¹] > 0 since ¹ˆ q > 0,
¹ ˆ D > 0, ˆ Tˆ q > 0 and Á0 < 0. Therefore, if the entitlement spending as a ratio to
GDP is held invariant to changes in the debt-GDP ratio, the system is globally
unstable. Any increase in the debt-income ratio above the steady-state level is
bound to lead to an exploding debt-GDP ratio.
A.5. With entitlement spending as a ratio to GDP made a negative function of
the debt-income ratio, we have to modify the original value of a11 to get a11 ´
¹+¹ ˆ D ˆ Dss +Φ ˆ D. In the empirically relevant case where a depressed stock market
leads to rising debt-income ratios so a12 < 0, we ﬁnd that in order to achieve
saddle-path stability, it will be necessary though not suﬃcient for ˆ ys to fall in
response to an increase in ˆ D so that a11 is negative. In other words, a unit increase
in the debt-income ratio necessitates a cut in entitlement spending as a ratio to
GDP that more than oﬀsets the rise in interest costs so that the debt-income ratio
actually declines. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for saddle-path stability,
and hence ﬁscal sustainability in response to a tax cu with gradual welfare payment
adjustment, in the case when a12 < 0 is for ¡(a11) > ¡a12(a21=a22) > 0. Noting
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we obtain saddle-path stability only if both stationary loci are negatively sloped























If a decline in stock market capitalization as a ratio to GDP leads to bigger
cost savings for the government (as a result of a huge drop in interest debt service
burden) than its loss of tax revenue (relative to GDP) so a12 > 0, then the condition
for ﬁscal sustainability is immediately satisﬁed by a ﬁscal rule that makes ˆ ys fall
suﬃciently in response to a rise in ˆ D to make a11 negative. (Referring to (29) and
(30), this condition says that when a12 > 0 and a11 < 0, we are assured of saddle-
path stability and the stationary locus for ˙ ˆ D = 0 is positively sloped in the ( ˆ D; ˆ q)
plane.) If a12 > 0, the condition that a11 < 0 is suﬃcient for ﬁscal sustainability
but it is not necessary. If declining asset prices lead to a smaller loss in tax revenue
(relative to GDP) than the government can save from a decline in interest costs so
the debt-income ratio actually falls, then, in order to attain ﬁscal sustainability, big
cuts in entitlement spending may not be required when the debt-income ratio rises
so a11 remains positive so long as the condition 0 < a11 < a12(a21=a22) is satisﬁed.
Referring to (29) and (30), this condition says that when a12 > 0 and a11 > 0, we


























In summary, there are three cases where we obtain saddle-path stability. If a
drop in ˆ q leads to a greater loss in tax revenue (relative to GDP) than cost savings
from a lower interest debt service burden so a12 < 0, the only way to achieve saddle-
path stability is to cut entitlement spending as a ratio to GDP sharply enough to
39make not only a11 < 0 but also to satisfy the condition: ¡a11 > ¡a12(a21=a22) > 0.
However, if a drop in ˆ q leads to greater interest cost savings for the government
than the amount of tax revenue lost (relative to GDP), saddle-path stability is
guaranteed for a government that cuts entitlement spending as a ratio to GDP
suﬃciently to make a11 < 0. In this case, we have a12 > 0 and a11 < 0 so Det(A)
is unambiguously negative. If a12 > 0, the government can, in fact, attain ﬁscal
sustainability without sharp cuts to entitlement spending as a ratio to GDP so
long as 0 < a11 < a12(a21=a22). Letting ¸1 = [Tr(A) ¡
p
Tr(A)2 ¡ 4Det(A)]=2
be the negative root, the slope of the saddle path is given by (¸1 ¡ a11)=a12 =
a21=(¸1¡a22), which is unambiguously negative in all the three cases summarized
here. The interested reader can proceed to draw the relevant phase diagrams
corresponding to the two cases where a drop in ˆ q leads to larger interest cost
savings for the government than the tax revenue lost (relative to GDP). It is
readily checked that the qualitative results regarding the eﬀects on asset prices
and employment of the tax shocks we study are similar in all three cases. The
diﬀerences occur in the short-term movement of the debt-income ratio in response
to asset price changes since, at any given ˆ D, a fall of ˆ q leads to a gradual buildup
of the debt-income ratio when a12 ´ ¹ˆ q ˆ Dss ¡ ˆ Tˆ q < 0 but to a gradual decrease
of the debt-income ratio when a12 ´ ¹ˆ q ˆ Dss ¡ ˆ Tˆ q > 0: We, however, conduct our
analysis in the main text with the aid of Figure 4 and so focus on the case where
a12 ´ ¹ˆ q ˆ Dss ¡ ˆ Tˆ q < 0.
A.6. To establish that an announcement made at t0 = 0 that the tax rate will be
permanently reduced from ¿0 to ¿1, ¿1 < ¿0, from time t1 = T onwards causes ˆ q at
t0 to drop, we proceed as follows. We let the eigenvalues associated with the system
represented in Figure 4 and (29) and (30) be denoted ¸1 and ¸2. The fact that the
system is saddle-path stable means that the product ¸1¸2 = a11a22 ¡ a12a21 < 0.
We shall assume ¸1 < 0 and ¸2 > 0. Over the period 0 < t · T, before the tax
cut occurs, the solutions for ˆ Dt and ˆ qt are of the form
ˆ Dt = ˆ D0
ss + A1e¸1t + A2e¸2t;


















< 0; i = 1;2:
For the period t > T, after the tax cut has occurred, the solutions for ˆ Dt and ˆ qt
are
ˆ Dt = ˆ D1
ss + A0
1e¸1t;








Hence after time T, ˆ Dt and ˆ qt must follow the saddle path leading to ˆ D1
ss and ˆ q1
ss,
respectively.
Assuming that at time 0, ˆ D is at ˆ D0
ss implies A1 + A2 = 0. At time T, since
qT and DT cannot jump, and noting that ˆ q ´ q=Ω(q;¿) and ˆ D ´ D=Ω(q;¿) so ˆ q
and ˆ D change equiproportionately at time T, we obtain
[Ω(qT;¿0)A1 ¡ Ω(qT;¿1)A0





















































The initial response of ˆ q at time 0 is given by



















41We note that (¸1 ¡ a11)=a12 = a21=(¸1 ¡ a22), which gives the slope of the
saddle-path, is negative and that ¯D > 0 but the sign of ¯q is ambiguous. However,
we now show that for small changes, ¯q ¡[(¸1 ¡a11)=a12]¯D < 0, a condition that




















For small changes evaluated around the original stationary state ( ˆ D0
ss, ˆ q0
ss), the
square bracketed term converges to the value giving the gradient of the ˙ ˆ q = 0 locus
at ( ˆ D0
ss, ˆ q0
ss), which is equal to ¡a21=a22. Since, as we can observe from Figure 4,







































Consequently, we establish that ˆ q0 drops below ˆ q0
ss in response to the tax cut.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the extent of the initial drop of ˆ q is inversely related to
how far away in time the tax cut will be implemented, T.








where R(t;·) ´ exp
¡
R ·
t (r(º)+µ)dº, where the two parts of the integral correspond
to the working and retired phases of the individual’s life. The aggregate human






















The ﬁrst integral on the RHS gives the present discounted value of beneﬁts received
by the fraction of the population that is retired at time t; the second gives the
after-tax wage income received by the working fraction of the population at time t
until their retirement at s + tW; and the third integral gives the beneﬁts that the
working fraction of the population at time t will receive upon their retirement.
By shifting the order of integration and diﬀerentiating, we obtain







The law of motion describing the aggregate non-human wealth accumulation is
given by
˙ W(t) = r(t)W(t) + (1 ¡ e¡µtW)vf(t)L(t) ¡ C(t):
Using C = (µ+½)(H+W) and ˙ C = (µ+½)( ˙ H+ ˙ W), and assuming that non-human
wealth is entirely in share holdings, we then obtain (32).
To prove that an increase in the share of retirees in the population, e¡µtW,
contracts output supply and increases unit cost, vf, we proceed as follows: The
supply wage relation we obtain after substituting the condition that consumption







(1¡e¡µtW )L ¡ 1
(1¡e¡µtW )
;
which at given total hours worked, (1 ¡ e¡µtW)L, is increasing in B, ¿ and e¡µtW.
The demand wage relation is given by
v
f












Equating the demand wage and supply wage, we readily establish that an in-
crease in the share of retirees, e¡µtW, contracts total employment (here, total hours
worked) and the unit cost, vf. Intuitively, an increase in e¡µtW (taken alone) raises
43the unit cost and reduces employment because an increase in the share of retirees
in the population shrinks the productive workforce and shifts the aggregate labor
supply curve leftwards.
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